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THE FAILURE OF FEDERAL BIOTECHNOLOGY 
REGULATION 
Alison Peck 
ABSTRACT 
The recent court case and state ballot measures regarding 
mandatory labels for Genetically Modified Organisms 
(“GMOs”) suggest the need for a deeper conversation about the 
federal framework for regulating biotechnology.  What is it 
about GMOs that consumers feel they have the “right to 
know?”  Why has a generation of federal biotechnology 
regulation failed to satisfy consumer concerns?  Are those 
concerns irrational, or is the regulatory structure inadequate?  
This Article argues that many consumer concerns underlying 
the labeling movement raise important scientific and extra-
scientific questions that have been apparent since the advent of 
the technology in the 1980s.  Moreover, these concerns persist 
because the Coordinated Framework for Regulation of 
Biotechnology has failed to respond to them effectively.  The 
Coordinated Framework was based on statutes that pre-existed 
the technology and thus poorly fit the unique risks of genetic 
engineering.  Today, genetic engineering is on the verge of a 
radical shift in technology, a shift that has already begun to 
burst the seams of those old statutes, leaving agencies with no 
regulatory authority at all over new products.  This Article 
reviews the evidence behind persistent concerns about GMOs, 
considers the failures of the Coordinated Framework to address 
the most valid of those concerns, and canvasses policy questions 
that Congress must consider to more effectively tailor agency 
authority to address the risks and to enhance the potential of 
this rapidly-changing field of technology. 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
It has become fashionable for the media to write off consumer 
concerns about GMOs as “science denial,” akin to denying scientific 
evidence of climate change or evolution.1  Nevertheless, those concerns 
                                                
 Professor of Law, West Virginia University College of Law.  This work was prepared 
with the support of the West Virginia University College of Law and the Arthur B. Hodges 
Summer Research Grant.  The author also wishes to thank the 2016 World Champion 
Chicago Cubs without whom this Article would have been finished a lot sooner. 
1 See, e.g., Fred Hiatt, Science That is Hard to Swallow, WASH. POST (Feb. 8, 2015), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/fred-hiatt-genetically-modified-foods-
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persist. Moreover, the controversy over labeling of genetically-engineered 
foods suggests the need for a deeper conversation about the federal 
framework for regulating biotechnology.2  Why do consumers feel they 
have the “right to know” if a food is genetically modified, and what, 
exactly, do they want to know about those foods?  Why has a generation 
of federal biotechnology regulation failed to satisfy these consumer 
concerns?  Are these concerns simply irrational, or does their persistence 
suggest that federal regulation has missed the mark? 
Instead of setting up a straw man by asking the simplistic question, 
“Are GMOs safe?,” what is needed is a careful consideration of the most 
legitimate concerns raised about genetically-engineered products and a 
carefully nuanced approach to regulation that addresses those legitimate 
concerns.  As United Kingdom journalist Mark Henderson stated:  “The 
whole question of being pro- or anti-GMO is in many ways a bad one.  The 
better question is what crop, with what modification, for what purpose, 
made by whom?”3  This Article seeks to take consumer concerns seriously, 
to identify the most legitimate public concerns, and to explain why the 
current federal regulatory framework fails to adequately respond to those 
                                                
prove-hard-for-americans-to-stomach/2015/02/08/3ae7902c-ad60-11e4-9c91-
e9d2f9fde644_story.html?utm_term=.6e20e47ce351 [https://perma.cc/JXB8-P2ZP]; see also 
Joel Achenbach, Why Do Many Reasonable People Doubt Science?, NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC (Mar. 
2015), http://ngm.nationalgeographic.com/2015/03/science-doubters/achenbach-text 
[https://perma.cc/VG7S-Z8NM]; William Saletan, Unhealthy Fixation:  The War against 
Genetically Modified Organisms is Full of Fearmongering, Errors, and Frauds.  Labeling Them Will 
Not Make You Safer, SLATE (July 15, 2015), http://www.slate.com/articles/health_and_ 
science/science/2015/07/are_gmos_safe_yes_the_case_against_them_is_full_of_fraud_lies
_and_errors.html [https://perma.cc/6BH8-3MGQ]. 
2 In recent years, several states passed laws requiring that genetically-engineered (“GE”) 
foods be labeled.  See, e.g., 2013 CONN. PUB. ACTS 9–10 (13-183); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22 
§ 2591 (2013); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9 § 3043 (2016); see also Ross H. Pifer, Mandatory Labeling 
Laws:  What Do Recent State Enactments Portend for the Future of GMOs?, 118 PENN. ST. L. REV. 
789, 790 (2014).  In 2015, a federal district court upheld the Vermont law against claims that 
it impermissibly mandated speech and restricted interstate commerce.  Grocery Mfrs. Ass’n 
v. Sorrell, 102 F. Supp. 3d 583, 615 (D. Vt. 2015).  Before the Vermont law could become 
operative, Congress passed legislation requiring the Department of Agriculture to develop 
a federal “disclosure standard” for genetically-engineered foods.  National Bioengineered 
Food Disclosure Standard, Pub. L. 114-126, 130 Stat. 834 (July 29, 2016).  The compromise 
legislation satisfied neither food manufacturers nor consumer’s groups.  Dan Charles, 
Congress Just Passed a GMO Labeling Bill.  Nobody’s Super Happy about It., ALL THINGS 
CONSIDERED (July 14, 2016), http://www.npr.org/sections/thesalt/2016/07/14/ 
486060866/congress-just-passed-a-gmo-labeling-bill-nobodys-super-happy-about-it 
[https://perma.cc/M25R-LQJF]. 
3 See The Geek Manifesto on GM Crops, GEEK MANIFESTO (May 24, 2012), 
https://geekmanifesto.wordpress.com/2012/05/24/the-geek-manifesto-on-gm-crops/ 
[https://perma.cc/AJY3-5C45] (expressing the need for more poignant questions about how 
genetically-modified (“GM”) crops are being utilized); see generally MARK HENDERSON, THE 
GEEK MANIFESTO 231–35 (2012) (discussing a variety of issues related to GM crops). 
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concerns.  This diagnosis of the real problem with GMOs is intended to 
pave the way toward modifications of the current regulatory structure 
that respond rationally to the persistent concerns of the majority of U.S. 
consumers. 
This Article concludes that, as research on human health impacts 
develop, consumer concerns raise legitimate questions about proven agro-
environmental impacts, socio-economic harms, and the appropriate level 
of precaution.  These questions remain reasonable even if, as GMO 
supporters assert, most genetically-engineered foods are safe for human 
consumption most of the time.  These reasonable consumer concerns have 
persisted, in large part, because they were ignored by the Coordinated 
Framework for Regulation of Biotechnology, released by the Reagan 
Administration’s Office of Science and Technology Policy in 1986 as the 
first attempt to coordinate federal oversight of the emerging technology.4  
The cracks in that foundation have begun to grow as some products now 
evade regulation under that framework.5  As long as federal regulators 
continue to ignore these cracks and fissures, public dissatisfaction with 
GMO regulation will continue.  Moreover, as genetic engineering 
continues to evolve and is set for a transformative breakthrough with the 
use of new technologies, biotechnology is set to outgrow the Coordinated 
Framework entirely, and discussion of a new regulatory structure is 
urgently needed.6 
Part II of this Article identifies actual and legitimate consumer 
concerns about genetic engineering and concerns that arise from scientific, 
as well as economic, social, and legal factors.7  Part III turns to the failures 
of the existing regulatory regime based on the Coordinated Framework, 
as well as risks that the Coordinated Framework does not purport to 
reach, such as trade losses and unique liability concerns relating to 
                                                
4 See Coordinated Framework for Regulation of Biotechnology, 51 Fed. Reg. 23,302 (June 
26, 1986). 
5 See infra Part III. 
6 See Memorandum from John P. Holdren, Assistant to the President for Science and 
Technology, to Heads of Food and Drug Administration, Environmental Protection Agency, 
and Department of Agriculture (July 2, 2015), https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/ 
default/files/microsites/ostp/modernizing_the_reg_system_for_biotech_products_memo
_final.pdf [https://perma.cc/B38G-5F9W] [hereinafter Coordinated Framework Executive 
Memorandum].  Federal Regulators recognize this dilemma.  Id.  On July 2, 2015, the 
Executive Office of the President issued a memorandum directing the three primary agencies 
that regulate biotechnology products to update the Coordinated Framework, “develop a 
long-term strategy to ensure that the Federal [biotechnology] regulatory system” is prepared 
for the “future products of biotechnology,” and commission an expert analysis of the future 
landscape of biotechnology products to support this effort.  Id. at 4. 
7 See infra Part II. 
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intellectual property rights.8  This Article concludes that new legislation is 
necessary in the near terms and, in Part IV, canvasses four major policy 
issues that any new legislation must resolve.9  Only a conscious and 
comprehensive scheme based on updated legislation can adequately 
regulate the risks of modern genetic engineering and simultaneously pave 
the way for technological developments and new products that could save 
lives and improve the environment. 
II.  PEELING OFF THE “SCIENCE DENIER” LABEL 
Under the headline “Science that is Hard to Swallow,” the Washington 
Post in 2015 featured an editorial about public opinion on GMOs that 
began, “Sophisticated readers know a science denier when they see 
one . . . .”10  The author, Fred Hiatt, noted that in a recent survey, eighty-
eight percent of scientists believed that genetically modified (“GM”) foods 
were safe to eat, while only thirty-seven percent of the public thought so.11  
The survey noted that it was the largest opinion difference between 
scientists and the public on a range of scientific issues surveyed.12  The 
author opined that the public’s fears would be warranted only if plant 
breeding itself, originating with Gregor Mendel, is unsafe, then lambasted 
the public for obstructing technological progress that might feed the 
hungry.13  Hiatt’s editorial compared those who believed GM foods are 
unsafe to eat with those who disputed the safety and efficacy of 
vaccination, with those who denied that climate change has 
anthropogenic causes, and with those who disputed the theory of 
evolution.14  The Washington Post is not alone in leveling this critique; 
others in the media have painted GM labeling proponents as anti-
science.15 
Is it true that consumer concerns about genetically-engineered 
products are scientifically invalid?  Part II.A considers three different 
categories of common consumer concerns—safety for human 
                                                
8 See infra Part III. 
9 See infra Part IV–V. 
10 See Hiatt, supra note 1. 
11 See id.; see also Cary Funk & Lee Rainie, Public and Scientists’ Views on Science and Society, 
PEW RES. CTR. (Jan. 29, 2015), http://www.pewinternet.org/2015/01/29/public-and-
scientists-views-on-science-and-society/ [https://perma.cc/3KYT-49SC]. 
12 See Funk & Rainie, supra note 11. 
13 See Hiatt, supra note 1. 
14 See id. 
15 See Achenbach, supra note 1; Saletan, supra note 1. 
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consumption, environmental or agro-environmental harms, and socio-
economic impacts—and identifies legitimate areas of concern.16 
A. Limited Consensus on Health Effects of Consuming GE Foods 
Are GE foods safe to consume?  Numerous scientific and popular 
sources have claimed a scientific consensus that consumption of 
genetically-engineered (“GE”) foods poses no risk to human health.17  
While most scientists and scientific bodies agree that most GE foods are 
safe to consume, claims that the safety debate is “over” tend to overstate 
the extent of scientific agreement. 
First, the general conclusion:  most scientific bodies agree that most of 
the GE foods tested to date are probably safe for human consumption.  In 
its 2016 report on genetic engineering, the National Academy of Science’s 
(“NAS”) “overall finding” on health risks was that “the committee found 
no differences that implicate a higher risk to human health from GE foods 
than from their non-GE counterparts.”18  While media reports have mostly 
emphasized this finding, claiming that the NAS declared all GE foods to 
be “safe,” they have also overstated their conclusions.19  Similarly, other 
scientific bodies have released opinions that generally validate the safety 
of GE foods.20 
Based on those opinions, fear-mongering about GE food consumption 
is unwarranted; studies so far have not convincingly shown that GE foods 
                                                
16 See infra Part II.A; see, e.g., 5 Reasons to Be Concerned about GMOs, GMO INSIDE.ORG, 
http://gmoinside.org/top-5-gmo-concerns/ [https://perma.cc/CCL9-DRA4]; 10 Reasons to 
Avoid GMOs, INST. FOR RESPONSIBLE TECH. (“IRT”), http://responsibletechnology.org/10-
reasons-to-avoid-gmos/ [https://perma.cc/2LME-JP7N]. 
17 See, e.g., Alessandro Nicolia et al., An Overview of the Last 10 Years of Genetically 
Engineered Crop Safety Research, 34 CRIT. REV. BIOTECH. 77, 84 (2014); Michael White, The 
Scientific Debate about GM Foods Is over:  They’re Safe, PAC. STANDARD (Sept. 24, 2013), 
https://psmag.com/the-scientific-debate-about-gm-foods-is-over-they-re-safe-
84697ee0b9a1#.hwl5dfcp6 [https://perma.cc/2UVP-47QY]. 
18 THE NATIONAL ACADEMIES OF SCIENCES, ENGINEERING, MEDICINE, GENETICALLY 
ENGINEERED CROPS:  EXPERIENCES AND PROSPECTS 149 (2016), https://www.nap.edu/ 
catalog/23395/genetically-engineered-crops-experiences-and-prospects 
[https://perma.cc/WT67-N7HL] [hereinafter NATIONAL ACADEMIES]. 
19 See, e.g., Andrew Pollack, Genetically Engineered Crops Are Safe, Analysis Finds, N.Y. TIMES 
(May 17, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/18/business/genetically-engineered-
crops-are-safe-analysis-finds.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/622B-WZQZ]; see also Kelly 
Servick, Once Again, U.S. Expert Panel Says Genetically Engineered Crops Are Safe to Eat, SCIENCE 
(May 17, 2016), http://www.sciencemag.org/news/2016/05/us-panel-releases-consensus-
genetically-engineered-crops [https://perma.cc/3AA5-FV28]. 
20 See, e.g., Frequently Asked Questions on Genetically Modified Foods, WORLD HEALTH ORG. 
(“WHO”) (Oct. 11, 2016), http://www.who.int/foodsafety/areas_work/food-technology 
/faq-genetically-modified-food/en/# [https://perma.cc/8HTD-FZD9] [hereinafter 
Frequently Asked Questions]. 
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are harmful to human health.  But, read in context, the statements of these 
health organizations are more qualified than any blanket assertion that all 
GE foods are safe.21  The NAS report acknowledged the existence of 
scientific uncertainty, stating that “many of the favorable institutional 
statements about safety of foods from GE crops . . . contain caveats, for 
example, ‘no overt consequences,’ ‘no effects on human health have been 
shown,’ ‘are not per se more risky,’ and ‘are not likely to present risks for 
human health.’”22  The committee noted that its own finding was stated 
very carefully so as not to overstate the “safety” of GE foods or any other 
foods.23  The report made a number of recommendations to help increase 
scientific certainty, such as identifying in studies what level of difference 
will be considered “biologically relevant;” conducting follow-up 
experimentation using trusted research protocols, personnel, and 
publication outlets where early published studies produced equivocal 
results; and providing public funding in the United States for such follow-
up studies.24  In a preface to the report, the chairman of the committee 
wrote, “We received impassioned requests to give the public a simple, 
general, authoritative answer about GE crops.  Given the complexity of 
GE issues, we did not see that as appropriate.”25 
On many questions, the NAS report notes that data is limited.  For 
instance, with regard to the question of whether foods from GE crops may 
affect gut microbes, the study concluded that the topic needs additional 
research to reach a reliable conclusion.26  With regard to the impacts of 
increased use of glyphosate in connection with glyphosate-resistant GE 
plants, the report concluded that the potential harm of GE crops is 
inconclusive to the degree that more research is needed to reach a higher 
level of certainty on glyphosate’s potential harm.  With regard to 
questions concerning an increase in cancer incidences, allergies, or celiac 
disease, the report noted that data was limited but based its conclusions 
primarily on roughly equivalent increases between the United States and 
Canada, where GE foods are consumed, and the United Kingdom, where 
they are generally not consumed.27  The report concluded that these 
comparisons in fact reflect a negative correlation between GE foods and 
incidences of cancer.28  The report acknowledged, however, that these 
comparisons also demonstrate that there is “no relationship between 
                                                
21 See generally NATIONAL ACADEMIES, supra note 18, at 113. 
22 Id. 
23 See id. at 10. 
24 See id. at 11. 
25 Id. 
26 Id. 
27 See NATIONAL ACADEMIES, supra note 18, at 136, 144. 
28 See id. at 137. 
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cancer and GE foods because there can be a delay in the onset of cancer 
that would obscure a trend, and one could hypothesize that something 
else has occurred with GE foods in the United States that has lowered 
cancer incidence and thus obscured a relationship.”29 
Other leading scientific organizations have also given their opinions 
in carefully worded language that is not often captured by media reports 
and have acknowledged the need for better safety assessments of new GE 
products.  For example, the World Health Organization (“WHO”) has 
stated that GM foods currently on the market are unlikely to present risks 
to human health, and no such impacts have been proven.30  However, 
WHO also states that GE food safety cannot be proven or disproven across 
the board:  “Different GM organisms include different genes inserted in 
different ways.  This means that individual GM foods and their safety 
should be assessed on a case-by-case basis and that it is not possible to 
make general statements on the safety of all GM foods.”31  WHO 
acknowledges three main areas of concern for human health:  allergic 
effects of transferred proteins; transfer of antibiotic-resistant to humans; 
or migration of genes from GM plants into conventional crops or wild 
relatives, which could have impacts on food production.32  Similarly, the 
American Medical Association (“AMA”) has stated that “[t]here is no 
evidence that unique hazards exist either in the use of rDNA techniques 
                                                
29 Id. at 137.  In this earlier 2004 report, the National Academy of Science (“NAS”) 
acknowledged that, at the time, “no adverse health effects attributed to genetic engineering 
have been documented in the human population.”  Id.  This statement is something of a 
truism, however.  Since no epidemiological studies on humans have been conducted, control 
groups are not possible because genetically-modified organisms (“GMO”) foods are not 
currently labeled and most people do not know if they have consumed them.  See also Safety 
of Genetically Engineered Foods:  Approaches to Assessing Unintended Health Effects, NAT’L 
ACADEMIES PRESS (2004), https://www.nap.edu/catalog/10977/safety-of-genetically-
engineered-foods-approaches-to-assessing-unintended-health [https://perma.cc/P5P3-
RBS2].  Moreover, the report concluded that “there remain sizeable gaps in our ability to 
identify compositional changes that result from genetic modification of organisms intended 
for food; to determine the biological relevance of such changes to human health; and to 
devise appropriate scientific methods to predict and assess unintended adverse effects on 
human health.”  Id. at 15.  The report agreed that genetic engineering using genes from 
diverse species has greater risk of producing unexpected effects than conventional cross-
breeding.  Id. at 66.  The report recommended both pre- and post-market assessment 
approaches to identify “unintended changes in the levels of nutrients, toxins, toxicants, 
allergens, or other compounds” in foods subject to genetic modification of any kind, 
including conventional cross-breeding and genetic engineering.  Id. at 2. 
30 See Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 20. 
31 Id. 
32 Id. 
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or in the movement of genes between unrelated organisms.”33  At the same 
time, however, the AMA also supports the implementation of safety 
assessments for GMO foods to detect unintended effects, toxicity, or 
allergenicity and to decrease use of antibiotic resistance markers in new 
genetically-engineered products.34 
Some recent studies of scientific opinion on the safety of GM foods 
also concluded that the literature shows a low degree of scientific 
consensus regarding the safety of GM foods and the need for further 
research.35  One study examined eight systematic reviews, twenty-six 
individual studies reporting adverse effects or uncertainties related to GM 
foods fed to animals, and the opinions of professional societies, like the 
NAS, the British Medical Association, and the Society of Toxicology.36  Of 
the eight systematic reviews, the author reported two reviews that found 
evidence of serious health impacts on study animals and one study that 
concluded that GM plants are safe—though distinct from non-modified 
counterparts on non-health-related parameters.37  The remaining five 
studies either reported some effects but did not draw conclusions about 
their health significance, concluded that little evidence had shown GM 
foods to be unsafe, but noted the limitations of the research to date, or 
focused primarily on the limitations of the research.38  The author 
concluded that no one can read these reviews and conclude that the 
science has resolved the health effects of GMOs.39 
                                                
33 H-480.958 Bioengineered (Genetically Engineered) Crops and Foods, AM. MED. ASS’N (2013), 
https://www.cga.ct.gov/2013/KIDdata/Tmy/2013HB-06527-R000305-AMA%20 
Bioenginerred%20Crops%20and%20Foods-TMY.PDF [https://perma.cc/4Y77-6TV6]. 
34 See id. 
35 See Sheldon Krimsky, An Illusory Consensus Behind GMO Health Assessment, SCI., TECH. 
& HUMAN VALUES (Aug. 7, 2015), http://emerald.tufts.edu/~skrimsky/PDF/Illusory% 
20consensus%20GMOs.PDF [https://perma.cc/2YVN-CXJY]. 
36 See id. at 12. 
37 See id. at 12, 15; see also B.M. Maghari & A.M. Ardekani, Genetically Modified Foods and 
Social Concerns, 3 AVICENNA J. MED. BIOTECHNOLOGY 109, 114–15 (2011); cf. C. Snell et al., 
Assessment of the Health Impact of GM Plant Diets in Long-Term and Multigenerational Animal 
Feeding Trials:  A Literature Review, 50 FOOD & CHEM. TOXICOLOGY 1134, 1146–47 (2012). 
38 See A.S. Bawa & K.R. Anilakumar, Genetically Modified Foods:  Safety, Risks and Public 
Concerns—A Review, 50 J. FOOD SCI. & TECH. 1035, 1044 (2013); Jose L. Domingo & Jordi Gine 
Bardonaba, A Literature Review on the Safety Assessment of Genetically Modified Plants, 37 ENV’T 
INT’L 734, 739–40 (2011) (summarizing the 2011 literature review, which chronicles a 
collection of research findings on studies on different species of animals); J.A. Magana-
Gomez & A.M. Calderon de la Barca, Risk Assessment of Genetically Modified Crops for Nutrition 
and Health, 67 NUTRITION REV. 1, 14 (2008); W. Zhang & F. Shi, Do Genetically Modified Crops 
Affect Animal Reproduction?  A Review of the Ongoing Debates, 5 ANIMAL 1048, 1056–57 (2011); 
Scientific Opinion on Application, European Food Safety Authority (EFSA-GMO-UK-2009-76) for 
the Placing on the Market of Soybean MON87769, 12 EFSAJ. 1, 34 (2014). 
39 See Krimsky, supra note 35, at 12, 15.  With regard to the twenty-six individual studies, 
Krimsky focused on the two that aroused the most controversy.  See Stanley Ewen & Arpad 
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Other sources agree that scientific debate persists.  In 2016, the NAS 
stated that “[t]he overall results of short-term and long-term animal 
studies with rodents and other animals and other data on GE-food 
nutrient and secondary compound composition convince[s] many . . . but 
not all involved researchers . . . that currently marketed GE foods are as 
safe as foods from conventionally bred crops.”40  Similarly, a 2015 joint 
statement signed by more than 300 scientific researchers and scholars 
stated that “the claim that [scientific consensus on GMO safety] does 
exist . . . is misleading and misrepresents or outright ignores the currently 
available scientific evidence and the broad diversity of scientific opinions 
among scientists on this issue.”41  The joint statement asserts that the 
available data on the safety of GMOs is inconclusive.42  The authors took 
issue with “a climate of complacency” arising from overstated claims of 
consensus leading to carelessness in both safety assessment and 
regulation of GE products.43  A European scientific organization has also 
                                                
Pusztai, Effects of Diets Containing Genetically Modified Potatoes Expressing Galanthus nivalis 
lectin on Rat Small Intestine, 354 LANCET 1353, 1354 (1999); Gilles-Eric Séralini et al., Long Term 
Toxicity of a Roundup Herbicide and a Roundup-Tolerant Genetically Modified Maize, 50 FOOD & 
CHEM. TOXICOLOGY 4221, 4229–30 (2012) (retracted 2014).  The Ewen & Pusztai article 
reported that rats fed a diet of GM foods, compared to controls, grew less well, showed 
unusual changes in tissue, and had immune problems.  Retraction Notice to “Long term Toxicity 
of a Roundup Herbicide and a Roundup-Tolerant Genetically Modified Maize,” 63 FOOD & CHEM. 
TOXICOLOGY 244 (2014).  The Séralini article reported adverse effects in rats fed with GM 
maize alone—for Monsanto’s herbicide glyphosate alone, and for GM maize with glyphosate 
residues—including “severe hormone-dependent mammary, hepatic and kidney 
disturbances.”  Séralini et al., supra note 39, at 4230.  Krimsky considered the firestorm of 
controversy that followed both articles, including the unprecedented decision by the journal 
Food and Chemical Toxicology to retract Séralini’s paper two years later, despite any evidence 
of fraud or intentional misrepresentation of data, on the grounds that the paper was 
“inconclusive.”  See Retraction Notice, supra note 39.  Analysis of the scientific validity of 
these two studies is beyond the scope of this Article, since even serious limitations in current 
research on GM food safety may support arguments in favor of greater federal regulatory 
oversight of biotechnology.  Id.  Nevertheless, the amount of criticism generated against these 
two studies and the unusual decision of a journal to retract a single animal study because its 
results were “inconclusive,” raises questions about whether reactions were unbiased.  Id. 
40 NATIONAL ACADEMIES, supra note 18, at 136 (emphasis added); see also Domingo & 
Bardonaba, supra note 38, at 739–40 (presenting results of studies conducted on different 
animal species); Angelika Hilbeck et al., No Scientific Consensus on GMO Safety, 27 ENVTL. SCI. 
EUROPE 4, 7 (2015) (finding lack of consensus after comprehensive review of animal feeding 
studies); Laura DeFrancesco, How Safe Does Transgenic Food Need to Be?, 31 NATURE BIOTECH. 
794 (2013), http://www.nature.com/nbt/journal/v31/n9/full/nbt.2686.html?message-
global=remove [https://perma.cc/7T83-GGRL] (discussing the dispute among researchers 
and regulators concerning food safety risk assessment standards). 
41 Hilbeck et al., supra note 40, at 2. 
42 See id. at 1. 
43 See id. at 2. 
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made statements denying a scientific consensus around the safety of GE 
foods.44 
Are GMOs safe to consume?  The simple answer to this question is—
we do not know with certainty.  So far, most studies and scientific 
organizations have not found evidence to indicate that GE foods are 
generally unsafe.  But scientific evidence remains insufficient, ambiguous, 
or of questionable objectivity.  Moreover, objective scientific groups 
emphasize that all GE foods are distinct and that it is not possible to make 
one-size-fits-all claims about their safety or lack of safety.  Given the 
limited data available, the scarcity of financially independent or publicly-
funded research, the variability from product to product, and the lack of 
scientific consensus, reasonable people may differ with regard to the 
appropriate level of precaution that should guide federal regulation and 
individual consumer decisions. 
B. Scientific Evidence of Adverse Environmental and Agronomic Impacts 
While proponents of GE food labeling usually cite concerns about 
health impacts, some consumers also seek to avoid purchasing products 
made with GE ingredients because of concerns about harm to the 
environment.45  Consumers whose desire for labeling of GE ingredients 
derives at least in part from environmental concerns that in no sense deny 
science, but rather call attention to ecological and agronomic impacts that 
have so far remained fairly obscured in the debate over biotechnology 
development, regulation, and impacts. 
Numerous sources have reported environmental benefits from the 
introduction of GE crops.46  Benefits include substitution of the glyphosate 
for more-toxic herbicides, greater adoption of conservation tillage, and 
decreased use of pesticides.47 
Those benefits, however, may soon be offset as farmers attempt to 
cope with the rise in glyphosate-resistant weeds, which have already 
caused major crop losses.  Four years after commercialization of 
genetically-engineered seeds, the first glyphosate-resistant weed 
appeared in a Delaware soybean field.48  In the first fourteen years of 
                                                
44 See, e.g., Statement:  No Scientific Consensus on GMO Safety, ENSSER (Oct. 21, 2013). 
45 See, e.g., GMO Facts, NON-GMO PROJECT (2016), http://www.nongmoproject.org/gmo-
facts/ [https://perma.cc/HC3K-ZZMD]. 
46 See, e.g., The Impact of Genetically Engineered Crops on Farm Sustainability in the United 
States, NAT’L ACAD. OF SCI. (2010), http://www.nationalacademies.org/includes/ 
genengcrops.pdf [https://perma.cc/P5P3-RBS2] [hereinafter NAS 2010 Report]. 
47 See id. at 1–2. 
48 See William Neuman & Andrew Pollack, Farmers Cope with Roundup-Resistant Weeds, 
N.Y. TIMES (May 3, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/04/business/energy-
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commercialization of glyphosate-resistant crops, ten glyphosate-resistant 
weed species had appeared in the United States; by comparison, only 
seven glyphosate-resistant species had appeared worldwide in the 
previous thirty-six years.49  Four years later, in 2014, fourteen species of 
glyphosate-resistant crops had appeared in thirty-two U.S. states.50  One 
of the most troublesome weeds, glyphosate-resistant Palmer amaranth, 
was reported in twenty-five U.S. states and in Brazil by 2015.51  The two 
species of weeds that most widely appear in crops grown with Monsanto’s 
glyphosate-resistant seeds are already resistant to other herbicides as 
well.52 
The appearance of glyphosate-resistant weeds has sent production 
agriculture scrambling to outdated herbicides and more labor-intensive 
strategies to control weeds.53  Some studies showed that despite more than 
doubling farmers’ herbicide costs, herbicides were still insufficient to 
control glyphosate-resistant Palmer amaranth, which has affected U.S. 
cotton, maize, and soybean crops.54  In 2010, the president of the Arkansas 
Association of Conservation Districts told the New York Times, 
“[Glyphosate-resistant weed growth] is the single largest threat to 
production agriculture that we have ever seen.”55  The chairman of the 
Georgia Cotton Commission was quoted as saying, “If we don’t whip this 
thing, it’s going to be like the boll weevil did to cotton . . . [i]t will take it 
away.”56 
Farmers have shown reluctance to stop using glyphosate-resistant 
crops when facing problems with controlling glyphosate-resistant weeds, 
preferring instead to increase the amount and frequency of glyphosate 
use, to use other herbicides in addition to glyphosate, or to increase their 
                                                
environment/04weed.html?ref=business&_r=0 [https://perma.cc/57X2-K2H3]; Mark J. 
VanGessel, Glyphosate-Resistant Horseweed from Delaware, 49 WEED SCI. 103, 103 (2001). 
49 See NAS 2010 Report, supra note 46; see also Georgina Gustin, Roundup’s Potency Slips, 
Foils Farmers:  Resistant Weeds Are Spreading North, Adding Costs, Workload, ST. LOUIS POST-
DISPATCH (July 25, 2010), http://www.stltoday.com/business/roundup-s-potency-slips-
foils-farmers/article_b503aada-7f4e-5ded-86d4-8eb0703ef7bb.html [https://perma.cc/3K 
FU-FF6H]; cf. Neuman & Pollack, supra note 48. 
50 See Weeds Resistant to EPSP Synthase Inhibitors (G/9) by Species and Country, INT’L SURVEY 
OF HERBICIDE RESISTANT WEEDS, http://www.weedscience.org/summary/MOA.aspx? 
MOAID=12 [https://perma.cc/NZ5E-ET2Y] [hereinafter Heap Table]. 
51 See id. 
52 See id. 
53 See Lynn M. Sosnoskie & A. Stanley Culpepper, Glyphosate-Resistant Palmer Amaranth 
(Amaranthus palmeri) Increases Herbicide Use, Tillage, and Hand-Weeding in Georgia Cotton, 62 
WEED SCI. 393, 400 (2014). 
54 See id.; see also Sarah M. Ward et al., Palmer Amaranth (Amaranthus palmeri):  A Review, 
27 WEED TECH. 12, 17 (2013). 
55 Neuman & Pollack, supra note 48. 
56 Id. 
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use of tillage.57  In 2010, the NAS stated that “the environmental 
consequences of those practices, if they were widely adopted by 
producers of [herbicide-resistant] crops, would negate the environmental 
benefits previously achieved [through use of GE crops].”58  Seed 
developers have more recently received approvals for new seed varieties 
with resistance to herbicides besides or in addition to glyphosate.59  
Nevertheless, the NAS concluded in 2016 that “[w]eed resistance to 
glyphosate is a problem” and that “integrated weed-management 
approaches beyond simply spraying mixtures of herbicides are needed.”60  
The report observed that empirical evidence is currently insufficient to 
determine the most effective management strategy and that farmers will 
be unable to move away from intensive use of herbicides without more 
assistance from knowledgeable extension agents.61 
While the impacts of glyphosate-resistance are among the primary 
environmental concerns from GE crops, scientists have observed other 
impacts that raise environmental concerns as well.  These include:  a shift 
to more toxic pesticides as weeds develop glyphosate resistance; transfer 
of GE traits to non-GE varieties of cultivated crops in neighboring fields, 
which can reduce food crop biodiversity; transfer of GE traits to weedy 
relatives, which may produce weed-management problems; and transfer 
of GE traits to wild strains, which can then outcompete wild strains and 
reduce genetic diversity available for crop improvement.62  While the 
scope of these environmental impacts remains uncertain, some 
consumers’ concerns about these risks reflect not a denial of science, but 
rather a high degree of sensitivity to the risk. 
Moreover, new genetic engineering technologies raise the possibility 
of new unintended environmental consequences.  For example, recent 
technological breakthroughs now permit scientists to proliferate genetic 
                                                
57 See NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL ET AL., IMPACT OF GENETICALLY ENGINEERED CROPS 
ON FARM SUSTAINABILITY IN THE UNITED STATES 75 (2010) [hereinafter FARM SUSTAINABILITY]. 
58 Id. at 77. 
59 See 2,4-D- and Dicamba-Tolerant Crops—Some Facts to Consider, PURDUE EXTENSION (Nov. 
2012), https://www.extension.purdue.edu/extmedia/id/id-453-w.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
YD29-V4F3]; see also Petitions for Determination of Nonregulated Status, BIOTECHNOLOGY (Oct. 
16, 2016), https://www.aphis.usda.gov/biotechnology/petitions_table_pending.shtml 
[https://perma.cc/8BRV-K63Q]. 
60 NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCE ET AL., GENETICALLY ENGINEERED CROPS:  EXPERIENCES 
AND PROSPECTS 90 (2016). 
61 See id. at 89–90. 
62 See FARM SUSTAINABILITY, supra note 57, at 107.  In the United States, scientists have 
documented at least fifteen crop species that hybridize with weedy relatives.  Id.  Since only 
a few crops (sunflower, pecan, blueberry, and some squashes) were domesticated in the 
United States, the risk to conservation of genetic diversity is less acute here than in countries 
with more native species and landraces.  Id. 
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modifications throughout entire species—or even eliminate a species 
entirely—in just a few generations.63  Scientists hope these techniques, 
called gene drives, will lead to life-saving advances, such as the 
elimination of malaria-carrying mosquitos.64  While this possibility holds 
great promise for biological control of risks such as mosquito-spread 
diseases, benefits of such controls must outweigh the harm, or the “fitness 
cost,” to the target organism or its ecosystem.65  Moreover, the risk of 
unintended and quickly irreversible consequences is substantial, as 
scientists estimate that gene drive modifications may become fixed in a 
population within tens of generations.66  Since those effects would almost 
certainly cross borders, political and legal ramifications of ecological 
changes would be complex.67 
C. Consumer Concerns outside the Realm of Science 
Finally, some consumers wish to avoid purchasing GM foods because 
of economic or social concerns, about which science has nothing to say.68  
Many of these impacts are well documented and significant.  Some have 
already resulted in multi-million dollar liability for seed developers, while 
the full extent of economic and social costs cannot yet be estimated.69  A 
few of these concerns are discussed below. 
                                                
63 See Robert L. Unckless et al., Modeling the Manipulation of Natural Populations by the 
Mutagenic Chain Reaction, GENETICS INVESTIGATION (July 30, 2015), 
http://www.genetics.org/content/early/2015/07/30/genetics.115.177592 
[https://perma.cc/4S8U-ZWVY]. 
64 See NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCE ET AL., GENE DRIVES ON THE HORIZON:  ADVANCING 
SCIENCE, NAVIGATING UNCERTAINTY, AND ALIGNING RESEARCH WITH PUB. VALUES 1 (2016). 
65 See Unckless et al., supra note 63 (“[T]he speed of the process presents reason for 
considerable caution before considering a field release of such a construct . . . .”). 
66 See Samantha Mathewson, Gene Editing Technology Could Have Serious Consequences, 
Researchers Say, NATURE WORLD NEWS (Oct. 6, 2015), http://www.natureworld 
news.com/articles/17271/20151006/gene-editing-technology-serious-consequences-
researchers.htm [https://perma.cc/Z7YA-BC7M] (quoting lead study author saying 
“[t]hat’s one of the things that is scary, if you imagine that one of these alleles gets into a 
population that you don’t want it in”). 
67 See Kevin M. Esvelt et al., Concerning RNA-Guided Gene Drives for the Alteration of Wild 
Populations, ELIFE (July 17, 2014), http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/ 
PMC4117217/ [https://perma.cc/8F7Q-K672]. 
68 See, e.g., GMO Facts:  Frequently Asked Questions, NON GMO PROJECT (Oct. 16, 2016), 
http://www.nongmoproject.org/learn-more/ [https://perma.cc/TZ3C-A4EH]. 
69 See infra Part C.1. 
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1. Uncertainty for Farmers about Liability for Adventitious Presence of 
GM Seed 
GE traits in crops in one farmer’s field can be transferred by wind or 
insects to cross-pollinate with non-GE crops in a different farmer’s field.70  
This raises the possibility of intellectual property violations, since GE seed 
may legally be grown only under licensing agreements between the seed 
developer and the farmer.71  This raises several complicated and unsettled 
legal issues for the farmer on whose land the non-licensed seed is found.  
First, can the seed developer sue the farmer for violating its patent?  If the 
use is intentional, the answer is yes, but if the adventitious presence 
occurred because of unintentional cross-pollination, then the answer is 
no.72  Proving a farmer’s intent (or lack thereof), however, can be 
complicated and costly. 
Second, where GE seed has adventitiously appeared in non-GE fields, 
who should bear the losses incurred when the non-GE farmer loses sales 
to buyers that want only non-GE crops?  This debate has been referred to 
as the “fence in/fence out” dilemma, and tort law principles have not 
resolved who should bear the burden of keeping GE and non-GE crops 
separate in the fields (and losses when such strategies fail).73  A federal 
task force considered the possibility of establishing some type of 
compensation mechanism to compensate farmers for such losses, but its 
final report failed to make a definitive recommendation.74 
2. Harm to Farmers and Damage to U.S. Trade Relations from Loss of 
Foreign Markets 
Neither the Coordinated Framework nor any other federal law 
instructs the United States Department of Agriculture (“USDA”) or any 
                                                
70 See FARM SUSTAINABILITY, supra note 57, at 104. 
71 See 2008 Monsanto Technology/Stewardship Agreement, GROWER LICENSING, MONSANTO 
(Oct. 16, 2016), http://www.monsanto.com/sitecollectiondocuments/tug_sample.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/XN67-HY9A]. 
72 See generally Benjamin M. Cole et al., Food for Thought:  Genetically Modified Seeds as De 
Facto Standard—Essential Patents, 85 U. COLO. L. REV. 314, 326–27 (2014). 
73 See Thomas P. Redick, Coexistence of Biotech and Non-GMO or Organic Crops, 19 DRAKE J. 
AGRIC. L. 39, 49–50 (2014). 
74 See UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE, ENHANCING COEXISTENCE:  A REPORT 
OF THE AC21 TO THE SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE 9 (Nov. 19, 2012) (reporting that 
“[m]embers of the AC21 are not in agreement about the extent to which a systemic problem 
exists and whether there is enough data to warrant a compensation mechanism to address 
it”).  The task force recommended that the United States Department of Agriculture 
(“USDA”) gather data to evaluate the scope of the problem and, if it found that a 
compensation mechanism was warranted, to model the mechanism after federal crop 
insurance programs.  Id. at 14–15. 
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other agency to coordinate with regulators in other major markets to 
coordinate approval.  Since regulators in different countries will approve 
traits at different times—and in some countries, regulators may decline to 
approve some traits at all—farmers engaging in international sales of GE 
crops must be certain that their harvests do not contain traits not approved 
for sale in the destination country.75  Where shipments contain GE traits—
whether intentionally or adventitiously—that have not been approved in 
the destination country, buyers in that country may seek damages for 
losses related to those unapproved shipments, refuse to buy future 
shipments from GE producers in the country of origin, and decline to buy 
from non-GE producers in the country of origin because of concerns over 
adventitious presence of the unapproved trait.76 
Asynchronous approvals have led to catastrophic harms to farmers of 
both GE and non-GE seed.  In a pending lawsuit against Syngenta, for 
example, plaintiffs seek to recover billions of dollars arising out of market 
losses related to asynchronous approvals between the United States and 
China.77  Two Syngenta corn products genetically engineered with 
pesticide resistance were deregulated by the Animal and Plant Health 
Inspection Service (“APHIS”) in 2010 and 2013.78  In the following years, 
corn with those traits contaminated fields of other corn farmers in the 
United States through cross-pollination and eventually infiltrated the 
general domestic corn supply.79  In November 2013, China, which had not 
yet approved the traits, began rejecting all corn from the United States 
                                                
75 See Laura Rance, Gap Between Innovation, Approval Leaves Farmers Outside Looking In, 
WINNIPEG FREE PRESS (May 28, 2016), http://www.winnipegfreepress.com/business/gap-
between-innovation-approval-leaves-farmers-outside-looking-in-381191781.html 
[https://perma.cc/W7SX-L8A3]. 
76 See id. (providing steps that buyers can take when shipments containing GE traits 
arrive). 
77 See Ray Scherer, Lawsuits Seek Loss Recovery for Corn Farmers, ST. JOSEPH NEW-PRESS 
(Apr. 18, 2016), http://www.newspressnow.com/news/local_news/lawsuits-seek-loss-
recovery-for-corn-farmers/article_6d7f3b69-d496-529a-9dd6-7aa7df45f139.html 
[https://perma.cc/9AAE-AQDH]; see also Scott+Scott, LLP, Scott+Scott, Attorneys at Law, 
LLP Files Class Action on Behalf of Corn Farmers Harmed by Drop in U.S. Corn Prices—SYT, 
GLOBENEWSWIRE (Jan. 15, 2015), https://globenewswire.com/news-
release/2015/01/15/697835/10115808/en/Scott-Scott-Attorneys-at-Law-LLP-Files-Class-
Action-on-Behalf-of-Corn-Farmers-Harmed-by-Drop-in-U-S-Corn-Prices-SYT.html 
[https://perma.cc/GPQ5-YPGS]. 
78 See generally Regulation, Testing, and Deregulation of MIR162, SYNGENTACORNCASE (Oct. 
18, 2016), http://www.syngentacorncase.com/about-the-case/case-updates-documents/ 
class-action/factual-allegations/regulation-testing-and-deregulation-of-mir162/ 
[https://perma.cc/R4T6-YTXM]; see also Determination of Nonregulated Status of Event 5307 
Corn, USDA APHIS, (Oct. 18, 2016), https://www.aphis.usda.gov/brs/aphisdocs/ 
10_33601p_det.pdf [https://perma.cc/6C7A-BW9L]. 
79 See Mem. Order at 51–52, In re Syngenta AG MIR 162 Corn Litig., 131 F. Supp. 3d 1177 
(D. Kan. 2015). 
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containing the GE traits.80  In the lawsuit, the plaintiffs alleged that 
Syngenta misled the public about the timing and likelihood of China 
approving the pesticide-resistance traits.81  Plaintiffs claim for damages 
may total more than a billion dollars because they alleged that the decline 
in corn prices due to the loss of the Chinese market harmed plaintiffs who 
had not grown the GE corn as well as those that had.82 
APHIS currently does not appear to coordinate approvals with 
regulators in major export markets.83  In response to proposed 
rulemaking, commenters have pushed APHIS to consider coordination of 
approvals with other major markets.84  For example, in February 2016, 
APHIS announced its intent to prepare a Programmatic Environmental 
Impact Statement under the National Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”) 
for potential changes to its regulation of biotechnology products.85  
APHIS’s preferred action alternative would likely have excluded some 
products from APHIS permitting process.86  The grain and oilseeds 
industry association urged APHIS to ensure that any regulatory changes 
are “comparable and compatible, to the maximum extent possible, with 
regulatory approaches used by competent government authorities in 
important U.S. export markets so as to minimize or avoid the risk of 
                                                
80 See Ricardo Lopez, China Rejects Shipments of Genetically Modified Corn, L.A. TIMES (Dec. 
27, 2013), http://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-mo-china-rejects-shipment-of-gmo-
corn-20131227-story.html [https://perma.cc/DE3E-WT9R]; see also Christina Sarich, Biotech 
Outraged after China Rejects Several Billion Tons of GMO Corn, NATURAL SOC’Y (Jan. 8, 2015), 
http://naturalsociety.com/biotech-outraged-china-rejects-several-billion-tons-gmo-corn/ 
[https://perma.cc/BE9X-EXK5]. 
81 See In re Syngenta AG MIR162 Corn Litigation, 65 F. Supp. 3d 1401 (D. Kan. 2014). 
82 Mem. Order, supra note 79, at 3–4. 
83 See, e.g., Corn Refiners Association et al., Joint Statement to APHIS on Part 340 EIS Notice 
Biotech Regs 4-21-16 (Apr. 21, 2016), http://www.regulations.gov/document?D=APHIS-
2014-0054-0106 [https://perma.cc/HYZ7-DX75].  The authors of the letter state that their 
“organizations also are extremely alarmed about what appears to this point to be a lack of 
outreach by APHIS or on its behalf by other USDA agencies (e.g., the Foreign Agricultural 
Service) concerning changes being contemplated to Part 340.”  Id. at 3. 
84 See id. at 4 (“[I]ncreasing lack of coherence in various nations’ regulatory systems 
regarding safety reviews and approval of new biotech-enhanced events . . . have indeed 
prevented or reduced access of U.S. crops to foreign markets and resulted in very significant 
downward pressure on prices paid to farmers and reduced the economic value of U.S. 
agricultural production . . . .”). 
85 See Environmental Impact Statement; Introduction of the Products of Biotechnology, 81 
Fed. Reg. 6225 (Feb. 5, 2016). 
86 See Department of Agriculture, Environmental Impact Statement; Introduction of the 
Products of Biotechnology, ANIMAL & PLANT HEALTH INSPECTION SERV. (Feb. 1, 2016), 
https://www.aphis.usda.gov/newsroom/federal_register/brs_regs.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/JTV8-F6BQ] (inviting public input on “potential justifiable exceptions or 
exemptions that would exclude certain ‘products of biotechnology’ from APHIS”). 
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market and trade disruptions.”87  It is unclear whether the Coordinated 
Framework and the Plant Protection Act (“PPA”) give APHIS authority to 
consider economic, rather than agronomic and environmental, impacts of 
its regulations.88 
3. Lack of Market Incentives to Develop and Transfer Intellectual 
Property Rights to Life-Saving Technologies 
GM seed has been promoted as a way to dramatically decrease world 
hunger and malnutrition.89  Numerous applications of genetic engineering 
currently in the research and development pipeline might be beneficial to 
farmers and consumers in developing countries.  In a 2012 Food and 
Agricultural Organization (“FAO”) conference on the biotechnology 
pipeline in developing countries, participants identified a late blight 
resistant potato in Bangladesh, a golden mosaic virus resistant common 
bean in Brazil, a fungal resistant wheat in China, and many others.90  The 
most often-discussed example, known as “Golden Rice,” is genetically 
engineered to produce beta carotene, a good source of vitamin A, to 
reduce the incidence of blindness and other diseases in children whose 
diets rely heavily on rice.91 
                                                
87 Corn Refiners Ass’n et al., Joint Statement to APHIS on Notice of Intent to Prepare 
Environmental Impact Statement under 7 CFR Part 340, at 2 (Apr. 21, 2016), https://www.agri-
pulse.com/ext/resources/pdfs/j/o/i/1/6/Joint-Statement-to-APHIS-on-Part-340-EIS-
Notice-Biotech-Regs-4-21-16.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q63A-6BN5].  APHIS declined media 
requests to comment on the issue.  Philip Brasher, Grain Trade Alarmed by USDA Biotech Plans, 
AGRI-PULSE COMMC’N INC. (Apr. 27, 2016), http://www.agri-pulse.com/Grain-trade-
alarmed-by-USDA-biotech-plans-04272016.asp [https://perma.cc/3WR9-JPVL]. 
88 See Corn Refiners Ass’n, supra note 87, at 2–3. 
89  J. Madeleine Nash, Grains of Hope, TIME (July 23, 2000), http://content.time.com/time/ 
magazine/article/0,9171,50576,00.html [https://perma.cc/5T56-SWRH] (exemplifying the 
hope that GMO foods may provide a viable solution to malnutrition and world hunger). 
90 See John Ruane, An FAO E-mail Conference on GMOs in the Pipeline in Developing 
Countries:  The Moderator’s Summary, FOOD & AGRIC. ORG. OF THE U.N. (“FAO”) (2013), 
http://www.fao.org/docrep/017/ap998e/ap998e.pdf [https://perma.cc/PP9P-K9XP]; see 
also Crop Biotech Update, INT’L SERV. FOR THE ACQUISITION OF AGRI-BIOTECH APPLICATIONS 
(“ISAAA”) (June 22, 2016), http://www.isaaa.org/kc/cropbiotechupdate/newsletter/ 
default.asp?/Date=6/22/2016 [https://perma.cc/P8TB-ZKGQ]. 
91 Golden Rice has been widely discussed in the academic literature on genetic 
engineering and has been subject to considerable controversy.  See Peter Beyer et al., Golden 
Rice:  Introducing the Beta-Carotene Biosynthesis Pathway into Rice Endosperm by Genetic 
Engineering to Defeat Vitamin A Deficiency, 132 J. NUTRITION 506S (2002); see also John 
Christensen, SCIENTIST AT WORK:  Ingo Potrykus; Golden Rice in a Grenade-Proof Greenhouse, 
N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 21, 2000), http://www.nytimes.com/2000/11/21/science/scientist-at-
work-ingo-potrykus-golden-rice-in-a-grenade-proof-greenhouse.html?pagewanted=all&_ 
r=0 [https://perma.cc/3GGV-PR3A].  The Golden Rice controversy is largely outside the 
scope of this work, and the author does not intend to imply any position for or against the 
viability of the Golden Rice technology to deliver nutritional benefits.  Golden Rice is 
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To date, however, nearly all commercialized GM seed varieties have 
been engineered with traits that benefit farmers in developed, not 
developing, countries.92  The reasons are not science-driven, but market-
driven:  private sector seed development corporations, like Monsanto, 
have sufficient resources to develop new traits that might benefit 
developing-country farmers, but have economic incentives to focus on 
technologies that will be attractive to farmers in developed-country 
markets.93  For example, after a professor of plant genomics at UC-Davis 
pioneered a genetically-altered rice that resists Xanthomonas, Asia’s worst 
rice blight, Monsanto and Pioneer originally sought to license the gene.94  
As the university was negotiating the terms of the deal, however, 
Monsanto and Pioneer lost interest, and the technology has not yet been 
brought to market.95  The developers of Golden Rice required the 
assistance of the Rockefeller Foundation to negotiate licenses to the 
seventy protected intellectual and technical property rights belonging to 
thirty-two different companies and universities that were used in 
developing the transgenic rice.96  Transfer of the technology to researchers 
in developing countries to infuse the technology into locally-viable rice 
varieties added an additional layer of complexity.97 
According to the FAO, genetic engineering for developing country 
agriculture is being led by the public sector, the private sector, and some 
public-private partnerships, with strong leadership by the public sector in 
countries including Brazil, China, India, and Iran.98  As noted by a former 
Syngenta executive in the FAO conference, the private sector is likely to 
continue to focus on larger, more commercial crops, although a trend has 
                                                
mentioned only to highlight the challenges expressed by the developers in obtaining 
intellectual property rights and transferring those rights for public benefit. 
92 See Petitions for Determination of Nonregulated Status, USDA APHIS (Oct. 2016), 
https://www.aphis.usda.gov/biotechnology/petitions_table_pending.shtml 
[https://perma.cc/6GAA-TGQS]. 
93 See A. Max Jarvie, Productivity and Diversity in Research and Agriculture:  Improving the 
IPR Landscape for Food Security, 40 WM. & MARY ENVT’L L. & POL’Y REV. 849, 868–69 (2016). 
94 See Frederick Kaufman, Genetically Monetized Food, SLATE (Dec. 20, 2012), 
http://www.slate.com/articles/life/food/2012/12/plant_patent_law_why_overhauling_i
t_will_do_more_to_help_the_food_movement.html [https://perma.cc/E6M7-FJZE]. 
95 See id. 
96 See C.S. Prakash & Gregory Conko, Relevance of Genetically Modified Crops to Developing 
Countries, 34 CUMB. L. REV. 437, 442 (2003); see also Ann Weilbaecher, Diseases Endemic in 
Developing Countries:  How to Incentivize Innovation, 18 ANNALS HEALTH L. 281, 295 (2009). 
97 See Prakash & Conko, supra note 96, at 442–43. 
98 See Chantal Phol Nielsen & Kym Anderson, Genetically Modified Foods, Trade, and 
Developing Countries:  Is Golden Rice Special?, AGBIOWORLD (Oct. 2016), http://www.agbio 
world.org/biotech-info/topics/goldenrice/specialgoldrice.html [https://perma.cc/8QPN-
6XLM]. 
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begun for the private sector to address subsistence crops to some degree.99  
Until the public and private sector can overcome these market barriers to 
greater research and development in genetic engineering for developing-
country agriculture, claims of lifesaving impacts of genetic engineering 
may reasonably fail to convince many developed-country consumers of 
the life-saving value of GE crops. 
III.  THE FAILURE OF THE COORDINATED FRAMEWORK 
On July 2, 2015, President Obama created an inter-agency task force 
among the USDA, Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”), and 
Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) to update the Coordinated 
Framework and develop a strategy to prepare for changes in 
biotechnology.100  From the President’s charge, it is not clear whether the 
work of the task force will be limited to adjusting federal regulatory 
authority based on current statutes (Plant Protection Act, Federal Food, 
Drug, and Cosmetic Act, and Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and 
Rodenticide Act (“PPA,” “FDCA,” and “FIFRA” respectively)), or 
whether the task force is also authorized to request passing new 
legislation to expand or change federal agency statutory authority.101  The 
memorandum identifies the one-year objectives of the task force as the 
“development of an updated [Coordinated Framework] to clarify the roles 
and responsibilities of the agencies that regulate the products of 
biotechnology,” as well as the formulation of a long-term risk assessment 
strategy and the commissioning of an independent analysis of future 
biotechnology products.102 
To what extent can and will the federal agencies reinterpret the scope 
of their existing authority under the relevant statutes in a way that 
addresses persistent consumer concerns?  Are those statutes sufficiently 
broad to allow the agencies to exercise jurisdiction in a way that 
meaningfully responds to such concerns?  This Part addresses failures of 
                                                
99 See All Messages from the FAO 2012 E-mail Conference on “GMOs in the Pipeline:  Looking 
to the Next Five Years in the Crop, Forestry, Livestock, Aquaculture and Agro-Industry Sectors in 
Developing Countries,” FAO (Nov. 29, 2012), http://www.fao.org/fileadmin/ 
user_upload/biotech/docs/conf18msgs.pdf [https://perma.cc/PP9P-K9XP] (providing an 
e-mail from the participant stating that “[m]ajor R&D based companies are bound to focus 
on the larger and more commercial crops as that is where they will get the best returns and 
they have financial obligations to their shareholders”).  According to the participant, forces 
driving the trend include advances in plant genomics; diversification of private sector 
research from corn, soybeans, and cotton into rice and wheat; increasing prominence of 
corporate social responsibility; and increasing the market potential of developing countries.  
Id. 
100 See Coordinated Framework Exec. Mem., supra note 4. 
101 See id. at 3. 
102 Id. at 3. 
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the Coordinated Framework to address consumer concerns—failures 
arising both from agency interpretation of existing authority and from 
lack of agency authority to regulate current and emerging products or 
ancillary impacts of those products. 
A. Statutory Bases for Agency Jurisdiction under the Coordinated Framework 
In the Coordinated Framework, the White House Office of Science 
and Technology Policy (“OSTP”) divided regulatory authority for 
agricultural biotechnology among three federal agencies:  the USDA, 
which regulates the testing and commercialization of new agricultural 
biotech products; the FDA, which regulates the introduction and 
marketing of foods created through the use of genetic engineering; and 
the EPA, which regulates genetically-altered microorganisms and 
pesticide properties of genetically-engineered plant varieties.103  Each of 
these agencies regulates under statutes that pre-date commercial 
agricultural biotechnology.  The Coordinated Framework located the 
FDA’s authority primarily in the FDCA, a 1938 act that includes 
authorization for the FDA to ensure food safety through regulation of food 
additives and misbranding.104  The USDA’s authority was identified as 
stemming primarily from a law that dates back to the Federal Plant Pest 
Act of 1957, reorganized in the PPA, which gave the USDA jurisdiction 
over bacteria and viruses.105  The Coordinated Framework identified the 
EPA’s authority as deriving from the relatively modern pesticide and 
toxics control laws of the 1970s, including FIFRA and the Toxic Substances 
Control Act (“TSCA”).106 
                                                
103 See Neil A. Belson, U.S. Regulation of Agricultural Biotechnology:  An Overview, 3 
AGBIOFORUM 15, 15 (2000) (describing the three federal agencies that have regulatory 
authority for agricultural biotechnology). 
104 See 21 U.S.C. § 321(s) (2012) (defining the term “food additive”); § 321(n) (explaining 
what “misbranding” means); § 371 (providing the authority to promulgate regulations); 
§ 372 (describing the process for examinations and investigations); Federal Food, Drug, and 
Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. § 301 (2012) (introducing the definitions of the Federal Food, Drug, 
and Cosmetic Act). 
105 Plant Pest Regulations; Update of Current Provisions, 66 Fed. Reg. 51340 (proposed Oct. 
9, 2001) (to be codified at 7 C.F.R. pt. 330) (giving a brief explanation of how the Federal Plant 
Pest Act (“PPA”) has evolved over the years). 
106 See Chris A. Wozniak et al., Regulation of Genetically Engineered Microorganisms under 
FIFRA, FFDCA, and TSCA, EPA (Oct. 2016), https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/ 
2015-09/documents/ch4-wozniak-etal-fifra-ffdca-tsca-112012_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
5RN8-F2J4] (expressing that FIFRA and TSCA are toxic control laws that give the EPA 
regulatory authority of biotechnology products). 
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B. Insufficient Statutory Authority for USDA 
The first generation of biotechnology typically used Agrobacterium as 
a vector to insert the DNA of one species into the cells of a different 
species.107  Thus, the Office of Science and Technology Policy could argue 
that the USDA’s authority over plant pests also gave it authority over 
agricultural products created using these bacterial vector insertions of 
DNA (even though the viruses, once inserted, were not active and did not 
pose the types of threats that motivated the PPA).108  As long as developers 
used bacterial or viral vectors to deliver DNA to target organisms, 
however, the PPA arguably provided an adequate jurisdictional hook.  
But biotechnology developers now have tools other than viruses at their 
disposal to make genetic modifications to target organism DNA.  These 
tools include a “gene gun” that shoots DNA into cells without the use of 
any bacterial or viral vector and genome-editing technologies that allow 
scientists to directly edit or delete DNA rather than inserting anything.  
Biotechnology now, in 2016, stands on the verge of a technological 
revolution that will allow scientists to edit genes easily and with minimal 
cost. 
That technological revolution is based on changes in the mechanisms 
scientists use to accomplish genetic changes in an organism.  When the 
Coordinated Framework was released in 1986, all GE plants had been 
produced by using Agrobacterium tumefaciens as the vector to deliver the 
DNA to the species of interest.109  The administration’s decision in the 
Coordinated Framework to locate the FDA, USDA, and EPA statutory 
authority in the FDCA, PPA, and FIFRA was based on the assumption that 
bacteria would continue to be the mechanism for accomplishing the 
                                                
107 See Lan-Ying Lee & Stanton B. Gelvin, T-DNA Binary Vectors and Systems, 146 
PHYSIOLOGY 325, 325 (2008), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2245830/ 
pdf/pp1460325.pdf [https://perma.cc/L797-ZANB]. 
108 See Alex Camacho et al., Genetically Engineered Crops that Fly under the US Regulatory 
Radar, 32 NATURE BIOTECH. 1087, 1088–89 (2014), http://www.nature.com/nbt/journal/ 
v32/n11/pdf/nbt.3057.pdf [https://perma.cc/69GQ-WY7E].  In the PPA, Congress found 
that “the detection, control, eradication, suppression, prevention, or retardation of the spread 
of plant pests or noxious weeds is necessary for the protection of the agriculture, 
environment, and economy of the United States.”  7 U.S.C. § 7701 (2012).  A “plant pest” is 
defined as: 
any living stage of any of the following that can directly or indirectly 
injure, cause damage to, or cause disease to any plant or plant product:  
(A) A protozoan, (B) A nonhuman animal, (C) A parasitic plant, (D) A 
bacterium, (E) A fungus, (F) A virus or viroid, (G) An infectious agent 
or other pathogen, (H) Any article similar to or allied with any of the 
articles specified in the preceding subparagraphs. 
§ 7702. 
109 See NATIONAL ACADEMIES, supra note 18. 
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genetic modifications.110  Tellingly, however, the Coordinated Framework 
was out of date nearly as soon as it was written; within months, scientists 
began to publicize successful inventions of genetically engineered plants 
through a process called particle bombardment, or the “gene gun” that 
did not rely on bacteria to transfer genetic material.111  Using a gene gun, 
scientists can coat microparticles with RNA or DNA and accelerate or 
shoot the particles to pierce cell walls of the plant.112  The resultant 
organism expresses the inserted genetic codes.113  Since no plant pest is 
involved, APHIS’s jurisdiction under the PPA is not triggered.114  Another 
type of product already in use are null segregants, in which a transgenic 
parental line and a nontransgenic elite line are crossed to produce 
nontransgenic progeny:  the final product does not include the material 
used to transfer the new DNA, and thus does not trigger APHIS 
jurisdiction.115 
Even more critical, new technologies or technologies now on the 
horizon that do not rely on plant pests will make direct genome editing 
fast, easy, and cheap.116  Genome editing, an important class of new 
technologies, uses nucleases directed to a specific site on the DNA strand 
to delete, add, or change targeted DNA sequences in an organism.117  
Developers have used several different classes of these nucleases, most of 
                                                
110 See Coordinated Framework for Regulation of Biotechnology, supra note 4. 
111 See T.M. Klein et al., High-Velocity Microprojectiles for Delivering Nucleic Acids into Living 
Cells, 327 NATURE 70, 70 (1987). 
112 See id. at 71. 
113 See What Is Genetic Engineering and How Does It Work?, AG BIOSAFETY (2005), 
http://agbiosafety.unl.edu/basic_genetics.shtml [https://perma.cc/NS7F-89XS]. 
114 See, e.g., Michael C. Gregoire, Confirmation of Regulatory Status/Kentucky Bluegrass (Poa 
pratensis L.) (July 1, 2011), https://www.aphis.usda.gov/brs/aphisdocs/scotts_ 
kbg_resp.pdf [https://perma.cc/PZ97-ZDML] (introducing a letter from Michael C. 
Gregoire, the Deputy Administrator for APHIS, to Dr. Richard Shank, the Senior Vice 
President for Scotts Miracle-Gro Company).  In his letter, Gregoire concluded with the 
following:   
Because no plant pests, unclassified organisms, or organisms whose 
classification is unknown were used to genetically engineer this variety 
of GE Kentucky bluegrass, APHIS has no reason to believe it is a plant 
pest and therefore does not consider the Kentucky bluegrass described 
in the letter dated September 13, 2010 to be regulated under 7 CFR part 
340 and is not subject to the plant pest provisions of the PPA.  
Id. 
115 See Camacho, supra note 108, at 1088. 
116 See Amy Maxmen, Easy DNA Editing Will Remake the World, WIRED (Aug. 2015), 
https://www.wired.com/2015/07/crispr-dna-editing-2/ [https://perma.cc/H773-6NH3]. 
117 See NATIONAL ACADEMIES, supra note 18, at 241; see also Nicholas J. Baltes & Daniel F. 
Voytas, Enabling Plant Synthetic Biology through Genome Engineering, 33 TRENDS IN BIOTECH. 
120, 125 (2015), http://www.ask-force.org/web/Genomics/Baltes-Enabling-plant-
synthetic-biology-genome-editing-2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z5KV-B8QP]. 
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which are best known by their space age-sounding acronyms:  ZFNs, 
TALENs, and CRISPR.118 
CRISPR, the most promising of these techniques, accomplishes 
genetic mutations using two molecules—the Cas9 nuclease, which cuts 
both strands of DNA at a specific location to allow the mutation, and the 
guide RNA, a sequence of about twenty base pairs that guides Cas9 to the 
target location of the genome modification.119  The breaks in DNA are 
repaired by the cell, leading to deletions, insertions, or rearrangements 
using the template RNA sequence.120  The CRISPR/Cas9 system, which 
was based on the discovery of a similar natural system in some bacteria to 
resist viruses, is simple and cheap to use because it only requires scientists 
to synthesize the short, twenty-nucleotide RNA sequence.121 
Applications for genome editing using site-specific nucleases, 
especially CRISPR/Cas9, are promising for both human and animal 
welfare.122  In agriculture, for example, researchers are working to 
introduce into dairy cattle a genetic variant that causes into some beef 
cattle to lack horns.123  Farmers often de-horn dairy cattle, which are kept 
                                                
118 See Thorben Sprink et al., Plant Genome Editing by Novel Tools:  TALEN and Other Sequence 
Specific Nucleases, 32 CURRENT OPINION IN BIOTECH. 47, 47 (2015), http://ac.els-
cdn.com/S0958166914001979/1-s2.0-S0958166914001979-main.pdf?_tid=bf163418-8fc5-
11e6-a6dc-00000aab0f6c&acdnat=1476199195_da7d604f14efe49d0d890c8c3e5353bd 
[https://perma.cc/VHH8-P5UN]; NATIONAL ACADEMIES, supra note 18, at 242. 
119 See Baltes & Voytas, supra note 117, at 124; see also What Is CRISPR-Cas9?, YOUR GENOME 
(last updated June 07, 2016), http://www.yourgenome.org/facts/what-is-crispr-cas9 
[https://perma.cc/DSP6-GKXF]; Khaoula Belhaj et al., Editing Plant Genomes with 
CRISPR/Cas9 System for Plant Genome Editing and Beyond, 31 BIOTECH. ADVANCES 41, 41 
(2015), http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0734975014001931 
[https://perma.cc/4Y8G-ZJEP]; Luisa Bortesi & Rainer Fischer, The CRISPR/Cas9 System for 
Plant Genome Editing and Beyond, 33 BIOTECH. ADVANCES 41, 41 (2015); S. Antony Ceasar et 
al., Insert, Remove or Replace:  A Highly Advanced Genome Editing System Using CRISPR/Cas9, 
BIOCHIMICA ET BIOPHYSICA ACTA (BBA)—MOLECULAR CELL RES. (June 24, 2016), 
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0167488916301781 
[https://perma.cc/K3P9-X5PE]; NATIONAL ACADEMIES, supra note 18, at 244. 
120 See Bortesi & Fischer, supra note 119, at 41. 
121 See Martin Jinek et al., A Programmable Dual-RNA–Guided DNA Endonuclease in Adaptive 
Bacterial Immunity, 337 SCIENCE 816 (Aug. 17, 2012); see also Ruud Jansen et al., Identification 
of Genes That Are Associated with DNA Repeats in Prokaryotes, 43 MOLECULAR MICROBIOLOGY 
1565, 1565 (2002), http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1046/j.1365-2958.2002.02839.x/ 
full [https://perma.cc/5A95-MWVX]; Belhaj et al., supra note 119, at 76. 
122 See Dana Carroll & R. Alta Charo, The Societal Opportunities and Challenges of Genome 
Editing, 16 GENOME BIOLOGY 242, 242 (2015). 
123 See Wenfang Tan et al., Efficient Nonmeiotic Allele Introgression in Livestock Using Custom 
Endonucleases, 110 PROCEEDINGS OF NAT’L ACADEMY SCI. 16526, 16527 (2013), 
http://www.pnas.org/content/110/41/16526.full.pdf [https://perma.cc/7QDF-HLTC]; 
Wenfang Tan et al., Precision Editing of Large Animal Genomes, 80 ADVANCES IN GENETICS 37, 
70–72 (2012), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3683964/pdf/nihms 
471281.pdf [https://perma.cc/NM47-4AW6]. 
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in close quarters, for safety reasons, but physical de-horning methods are 
invasive, painful, and expensive.124  Introducing the trait through 
traditional cross-breeding would result in loss of favorable traits for dairy 
production, but genome editing could introduce the variant into existing 
dairy herds without interfering with other, more desirable traits.125  In 
medicine, genome editing is being used to explore the possibility of 
knocking out the gene for CCR5, the functional co-receptor in T-cells used 
by the HIV-1 virus.126  People who naturally lack the CCR5 gene may 
become infected with the virus but do not become sick because their T-
cells are resistant to being killed.127  Knocking out the CCR5 gene in bone 
marrow stem cells might provide long-term HIV-resistant T-cells to the 
recipient.128 
The challenge of these technologies for USDA jurisdiction is that they 
do not rely on bacterial or viral vectors to accomplish the desired genetic 
modification.  Without some form of plant pest present in the new 
product, APHIS has no grounds to exercise jurisdiction under the PPA.  
Since no general statute gives APHIS jurisdiction over any form of 
biotechnology as such (a more adaptable type of process-based approach 
to regulation), nor over any new plant variety presenting novel risks (a 
product-based approach to regulation), the APHIS cannot regulate or will 
not be able to regulate most new plant varieties created using biolistics, 
site-directed nucleases like ZFNs, TALENs, and CRISPR, and any other 
new methods that do not incorporate plant pests into the product 
organism. 
This gap in APHIS oversight already exists and is expected to explode 
in the near future as CRISPR technology advances.  Between 2011 and 
2015, developers submitted letters of inquiry to APHIS regarding novel 
products, seeking to know whether the products would be regulated.129  
Of the forty-nine products for which letters of inquiry were submitted to 
APHIS, only four were determined by APHIS to involve plant pests that 
                                                
124 See Bruno Graf & Markus Senn, Behavioral and Physiological Responses of Calves to 
Dehorning by Heat Cauterization with and without Local Anesthesia, 62 APPLIED ANIMAL BEHAV. 
SCI. 153 153–54 (1999) http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S016815919800 
2184 [https://perma.cc/L2P8-KR7T]. 
125 See Carroll & Charo, supra note 122, at 242–43. 
126 See Pablo Tebas et al., Gene Editing of CCR5 in Autologous CD4 T Cells of Persons Infected 
with HIV, 370 NEW ENGLAND J. MED. 901, 901 (2014), http://www.natap.org/ 
2014/HIV/nejmoa1300662.pdf [https://perma.cc/6V64-JMX6]. 
127 See Carroll & Charo, supra note 122, at 245. 
128 See id. 
129 See, e.g., APHIS, Am I Regulated under 7 CFR Part 340?, APHIS (June 8, 2016), 
https://www.aphis.usda.gov/aphis/ourfocus/biotechnology/am-i-regulated 
[https://perma.cc/J5F6-2SA6]. 
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would give APHIS jurisdiction.130  APHIS has indicated lack of regulatory 
jurisdiction over products created using biolistics (18), meganuclease 
deletions or substitutions (3), ZFNs (2), and TALENs (5).131  Smaller 
laboratories and public institutions may already be deploying these 
technologies as a strategy for avoiding federal regulation.132  Because 
CRISPR is simple and inexpensive, the technology may soon give rise to 
an explosion of new genetically engineered organisms from even very 
small research laboratories.133 
The failure to capture new genome-editing technologies in federal 
regulatory authority may have safety consequences.  Although these 
technologies offer important advancements over transgenic modifications 
because of their specificity and ability to limit off-target effects, techniques 
like CRISPR are not without risk that off-target effects will occur.134  
Without regulatory oversight, unintended consequences may occur and 
introduce risks that are not known until after commercialization and 
widespread release of the organism. 
At the same time, other new genetic engineering technologies raise the 
possibility of too much regulation.  These new products of genetic 
engineering may not raise the same level of risk, or generate the same level 
of public concern, as traditional transgenic products, but might 
nevertheless be subject to the same level of oversight under the PPA if 
accomplished using bacterial vectors.  For example, J.R. Simplot has 
developed a variety of potato using a technique known as intragenesis.135  
In intragenesis, developers package various plant DNAs from varieties of 
the target crop or its sexually compatible relatives, combine them into a 
gene delivery cassette, and insert them into the target organism.136  Unlike 
transgenic organisms, which combines DNA from non-sexually-
compatible species, these intragenic organisms could be made through 
                                                
130 See NAS 2010 Report, supra note 46, at 330 (Table 9-3); see also Camacho et al., supra note 
108, at 1090. 
131 See NAS 2010 Report, supra note 46, at 330 (Table 9-3). 
132 See Camacho et al., supra note 108, at 1087. 
133 See Maxmen, supra note 116. 
134 See Heidi Ledford, Enzyme Tweak Boosts Precision of CRISPR Genome Edits, NATURE (Jan. 
6, 2016), http://www.nature.com/news/enzyme-tweak-boosts-precision-of-crispr-genome 
-edits-1.19114 [https://perma.cc/FKF6-VP8P]; see also Benjamin P. Kleinstiver et al., High-
Fidelity CRISPR—Cas9 Nucleases with No Detectable Genome-Wide Off-Target Effects, 528 
NATURE 490, 490 (2016), http://www.nature.com/nature/journal/v529/n7587/pdf/nature 
16526.pdf [https://perma.cc/M892-LLUR]. 
135 See I.B. Holme et al., Intragenesis and Cisgenesis as Alternatives to Transgenic Crop 
Development, 11 PLANT BIOTECH. 395, 398 (2013) (noting that J.R. Simplot has developed 
intragenic potatoes). 
136 See NAS 2010 Report, supra note 46, at 37 (stating that varieties of crop DNA are 
combined and inserted into the cell in intragenesis). 
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conventional breeding, just less efficiently.137  While intragenic organisms 
may use Agrobacterium-mediated transformation and thus trigger 
APHIS’s jurisdiction under the PPA, the use of cisgenesis has triggered 
debate about whether these organisms pose the same level of risk as 
transgenic organisms and whether they should be regulated the same.138 
C. Insufficient Statutory Authority for the FDA 
Like the USDA’s authority under the PPA, the Reagan 
Administration’s decision to locate the FDA’s statutory authority in the 
FDCA was also based on the assumption that genetic engineering 
involved transgenic organisms.139  The FDA’s jurisdiction over GMO 
foods derives from the FDCA, which allows the FDA to regulate “food 
additives.”140  Since the first genetically-engineered foods involved the 
insertion of new DNA into a plant’s genome using bacterial vectors, that 
generation of GMO foods arguably fell within the statutory definition of 
a food additive:  “any substance the intended use of which results or may 
reasonably be expected to result, directly or indirectly, in its becoming a 
component or otherwise affecting the characteristics of any food.”141 
If the FDA had chosen to require new GE foods to go through pre-
market safety review as food additives, regulatory oversight and public 
participation would be significant.  Under full pre-market safety review 
for food additives, food producers are required to submit a petition to the 
FDA demonstrating safety of the food, accompanied by supporting data 
generated by scientifically accepted methods.142  The FDA may also 
require the petitioner to submit samples of the additive for testing, and 
provide descriptions of production methods and facilities.143  The FDA is 
required to make an independent determination within ninety days as to 
                                                
137 See id. (comparing the sexual compatibility of transgenic and intragenic organisms). 
138 See Henk J. Schouten et al., Cisgenic Plants Are Similar to Traditionally Bred Plants:  
International Regulations for Genetically Modified Organisms Should Be Altered to Exempt 
Cisgenesis, 7 EMBO REP. 750, 750 (2006), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/ 
PMC1525145/pdf/7400769.pdf [https://perma.cc/3RJ8-RWGT]; but see Eva Sirinathsinghji, 
Cisgenesis Is Still Genetic Modification with All the Attendant Risks, INST. OF SCI. IN SOC’Y (Aug. 
14, 2013), http://www.i-sis.org.uk/Cisgenesis_is_still_Genetic_Engineering_with_all_ 
attendant_risks.php [https://perma.cc/KWZ4-MZRG]. 
139 Coordinated Framework for Regulation of Biotechnology, 51 Fed. Reg. 23,302 (June 26, 
1986; see also FDA, Statement of Policy for Regulating Biotechnology Products, 51 Fed. Reg. 
23,309–23,312 (June 26, 1986). 
140 See 21 U.S.C. § 348 (2012). 
141 § 321(s). 
142 See § 348(b)(2). 
143 See § 348(b)(3)–(4). 
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the safety of the food before the food can be marketed.144  The regulation 
to approve the additive proposed by the petitioner must be published 
within thirty days of filing; although the FDCA does not mandate pre-
order notice and comment, the FDA as a practical matter receives or 
invites public comment on the proposed regulation.145  Orders issued by 
the FDA may be stayed pending a challenge by any person adversely 
affected and are subject to judicial review.146 
In a 1992 policy statement, however, the FDA announced a 
presumption that all GE foods are safe and thus exempt from food 
additive pre-market safety review process.147  A “food additive,” as 
defined in the statute, includes substances described above only “if such 
substance is not generally recognized, among experts qualified by 
scientific training and experience to evaluate its safety, as having been 
adequately shown through scientific procedures . . . to be safe under the 
conditions of its intended use . . . .”148  According to the FDA, all foods 
derived from genetic engineering fall into this generally recognized as safe 
(“GRAS”) exemption from the pre-market safety review process.149  The 
FDA reasoned, that “transferred genetic material [nucleic acids] . . . are 
present in the cells of every living organism . . . and do not raise a safety 
concern as a component of food.  In regulatory terms, such material is 
presumed to be GRAS.”150 
As a result of this presumption, all foods produced using GE are 
exempt from the pre-market safety review process for food additives 
unless the intended expression of the genetic material differs significantly 
from substances already found in food.151  Subsequent litigation showed 
that this presumption was questioned even by scientists within the FDA 
at the time it was announced.152  The FDA’s GRAS presumption and its 
                                                
144 § 348(c)(1)–(3).  The statute states that no “regulation shall issue if a fair evaluation of 
the data before the Secretary . . . (A) fails to establish that the proposed use of the food 
additive, under the conditions of use to be specified in the regulation, will be safe.”  Id. 
145 § 348(b)(5).  See also Lars Noah & Richard A. Merrill, Starting from Scratch?:  Reinventing 
the Food Additive Approval Process, 78 BOSTON UNIV. L. REV. 329, 371 (1998). 
146 See § 348(e)–(g). 
147 Statement of Policy:  Foods Derived From New Plant Varieties, 57 Fed. Reg. 22,984, 
22,990 (May 29, 1992) [hereinafter FDA Statement of Policy]. 
148 § 321(s). 
149 See FDA Statement of Policy, supra note 147, at 22,990. 
150 Id. 
151 See id.
152 See Alliance for Bio-Integrity v. Shalala, 116 F. Supp. 2d 166, 177 n.7 (D.C. Cir. 2012); see 
also Edwin J. Mathews, Memorandum from Dr. Edwin J. Mathews to the Toxicology Section of the 
Biotechnology Working Group.  Subject:  “Analysis of the Major Plant Toxicants,” (Oct. 28, 1991), 
http://biointegrity.org/FDAdocs/02/OEM1V.GIF [https://perma.cc/358S-ARTU]; Louis 
J. Pribyl, Comments from Dr. Louis J. Pribyl re:  the “Biotechnology Draft Document, 2/27/92” 
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consequences also raise democratic concerns:  without pre-market safety 
review, no public record of the FDA food safety approvals is created, and 
the public is deprived of any opportunity to review or comment on those 
decisions.  Given the scientific uncertainty about the health effects of 
consuming GMOs, this lack of transparency has led to considerable 
consumer distrust of the FDA’s determinations.  The FDA encourages a 
voluntary, non-public consultation process, which, as a matter of practice, 
all developers have utilized before bringing a new GMO food to market.153 
Moreover, it is unclear whether foods produced with new genetic 
engineering technologies will even fall within the FDCA definition of 
“food additive,” which applies only to substances that “becom[e] a 
component or otherwise affect[] the characteristics of any food.”154  In its 
1992 policy statement, the FDA stated, “[i]n the case of foods derived from 
new plant varieties, it is the transferred genetic material and the intended 
expression product or products that could be subject to food additive 
regulation, if such material or expression products are not GRAS.”155  But 
new GE techniques do not necessarily involve transferring any material 
into the plant products at all:  genome editing techniques like CRISPR, for 
example, directly edit the genome of the target organism without inserting 
any new material.156 
The “food additive” definition is deliberately broad, encompassing 
not only substances that become final components of the food but also 
substances used in production, manufacturing, and other phases of the 
food supply chain, if those substances are intended to affect the 
characteristics of the food.157  Nevertheless, the definition hinges on the 
existence of a “substance.”158  Under longstanding federal biotechnology 
policy, however, a genetic engineering process is differentiated from the 
genetic engineering product.159  As long as the FDA adheres to this policy 
                                                
(Mar. 6, 1992), http://biointegrity.org/FDAdocs/04/OPCOM1V.GIF [https://perma.cc/ 
P4TH-JFZM]. 
153 See FDA Statement of Policy, supra note 147, at 22, 984–91; Consultation Procedures under 
FDA’s 1992 Statement of Policy—Foods Derived from New Plant Varieties, FDA (June 1996, 
revised Oct. 1997), http://www.fda.gov/Food/GuidanceRegulation/GuidanceDocuments 
RegulatoryInformation/ucm096126.htm [https://perma.cc/Q5Q9-566B]; see also Premarket 
Notice Concerning Bioengineered Foods, Fed. Reg. 4,706 (Jan. 18, 2001); cf. Proposed Rule, 
Premarket Notice Concerning Bioengineered Foods, 66 Fed. Reg. 4706, 4,711. 
154 21 U.S.C. § 321(s) (2012). 
155 FDA Statement of Policy, supra note 147, at 22,990. 
156 See supra note 124 and accompanying text. 
157 See § 321(s). 
158 See id. 
159 See Exercise of Federal Oversight within Scope of Statutory Authority:  Planned 
Introductions of Biotechnology Products into the Environment, 57 Fed. Reg. 6,753, 6,755 (Feb. 
27, 1992) (“No conceptual distinction exists between genetic modification of plants and 
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choice, it will be difficult to stretch the definition of “food additive” to 
accommodate foods produced through genetic engineering processes that 
do not involve the addition of any “substance” even in the production 
phase.  Without the jurisdictional hook of food additive review under the 
FDCA, it is unclear whether the FDA will have any jurisdiction over new 
genetically-engineered foods, even the current voluntary pre-market 
consultation process.  Even the FDA’s authority to remove unsafe 
products from the market is based on its jurisdiction over “adulterated 
foods,” which are defined as “substances” that render the food injurious 
to health.160  The definition also excludes any substance that is “not an 
added substance . . . if the quantity of such substance in such food does 
not ordinarily render it injurious to health.”161  GE foods with no “added 
substance” may evade the FDA’s recall authority even in the event of a 
verified health hazard. 
D. Unduly Limited Role for EPA 
Despite the risks to the agricultural and the broader environment 
from the use of genetically-engineered crops, the Coordinated Framework 
designates relatively little EPA oversight.  The EPA regulates substances 
that are genetically engineered to control pests under FIFRA.162  Like other 
pesticides, most genetically-engineered pesticidal substances (called 
plant-incorporated protectants, or PIPs) must be safety-tested and 
registered with the EPA before they may be distributed commercially.163  
The EPA also regulates genetically-engineered microorganisms under 
TSCA.164  Under TSCA, any organization using a chemical substance that 
may present an unreasonable risk to health or the environment must 
submit a premanufacture notification to the EPA.165 
Despite potential environmental risks such as GE species crossing 
with wild relatives and the development of herbicide-resistant 
“superweeds,” the EPA does not have authority to control the 
environmental impacts of most of these products.  With the EPA’s limited 
statutory jurisdiction, most federal monitoring of environmental impacts 
                                                
microorganism by classical methods or by molecular techniques that modify DNA and 
transfer genes.”). 
160 § 342(a)(1). 
161 Id. 
162 7 U.S.C. § 136–136y (2012); see also 40 C.F.R. § 725.1(a) (2016). 
163 See § 136a(a); see also § 136a(c)(5). 
164 See 15 U.S.C. § 2601–95(d) (2012). 
165 See § 2605(a) (regulating “chemical substance or mixture[s]” that “present[s] or which 
will cause it to present an unreasonable risk of injury to health or the environment”); see also 
§ 2604 (citing the premanufacture notification requirement). 
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occurs pursuant to the National Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”).166  
Under NEPA, a federal agency is required to prepare an Environmental 
Impact Statement (“EIS”) any time the agency undertakes a major federal 
action “significantly affecting the quality of the human environment.”167  
With the FDA’s GRAS presumption for genetically-engineered foods 
under the FDCA and the limited scope of authority of the EPA under 
FIFRA and TSCA, the most significant federal action taken with respect to 
genetically-engineered products is most often a decision by the USDA to 
grant a developer’s petition for deregulation under the PPA.168  During 
the NEPA review, APHIS will consider a broad range of environmental 
impacts, including the potential of GE crops to contaminate non-GE crops; 
potential of herbicide-tolerant crops to generate herbicide-resistant weeds; 
and potential effects of GE traits on wild relatives.169 
While the NEPA analysis by APHIS offers an occasion for 
environmental monitoring, the protection available under NEPA is 
limited.  For one thing, an agency need not undertake to complete an EIS 
if, on the basis of a shorter Environmental Assessment (“EA”), the agency 
determines that the proposed action will not have a significant impact on 
the environment.170  Moreover, even if an EIS is prepared, NEPA does not 
prescribe any environmental norms by which impacts should be judged 
nor mandate any particular outcome concerning significant 
environmental impacts.  NEPA is a purely process-based statute, 
requiring only that the agency conduct the analysis, consider action 
alternatives, and explain its chosen outcome on the basis of the evidence 
in the EIS.171  In fact, APHIS rarely conducts a full EIS before granting a 
petition for nonregulated status.  Until issuing an EIS ordered by federal 
courts to prepare an EIS in connection with genetically-engineered alfalfa 
and sugar beets, APHIS had granted more than ninety petitions for 
                                                
166 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321–70(h) (2012). 
167 § 4332. 
168 See 7 U.S.C. § 7711(c)(2) (2012); see also 7 C.F.R. § 340.6 (2016). 
169 See, e.g., Rebecca L. Stankiewicz Gabel, Glyphosate-Tolerant Alfalfa Events J101 and J163:  
Request for Nonregulated Status, APHIS (Dec. 2010), https://www.aphis.usda.gov/ 
biotechnology/downloads/alfalfa/gt_alfalfa%20_feis.pdf [https://perma.cc/A4VG-
UM4J]. 
170 See 40 C.F.R. § 1508.9 (2016); see also § 1508.13. 
171 See Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 350 (1989) (stating that 
if “the adverse environmental effects of the proposed action are adequately identified and 
evaluated, the agency is not constrained by NEPA from deciding that other values outweigh 
the environmental costs”). 
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deregulation based on EAs.172  Of 123 products deregulated since 1995, 
APHIS has performed an EIS in only six cases.173 
E. Lack of Attention to Socioeconomic Impacts 
Federal biotechnology regulation mostly does not address 
socioeconomic impacts that are of concern to consumers.  Under a few 
statutes, agencies are allowed to consider socioeconomic impacts in 
making decisions; for example, FIFRA requires the EPA to consider “the 
economic, social, and environmental costs and benefits of the use of any 
pesticide” in determining whether the pesticide will have “unreasonable 
adverse effect on the environment,” and the NEPA analysis requires that 
agencies consider the “ecological, aesthetic, cultural, economic, social, or 
health” impacts of any major federal action.174  But even those examples 
of regulatory oversight of socioeconomic impacts are highly limited:  
FIFRA applies only to plants with pesticidal properties, and NEPA does 
not mandate any particular outcome based on the analysis of impacts.175 
This lack of attention to socioeconomic impacts is not inevitable; other 
countries mandate consideration of social and economic impacts in their 
regulatory systems for GE crops and foods.  The European Union, for 
example, requires labeling as a gesture to public concerns and has 
developed general guidance for managing coexistence between producers 
of genetically-engineered and conventional crops.176  Brazil protects non-
                                                
172 See Geertson Seed Farms v. Johanns, No. C 06-01075CRB, 2007 WL 776146, at *2–3 (N.D. 
Cal. Mar. 12, 2007); see also Ctr. for Food Safety v. Vilsack, 734 F. Supp. 2d 948, 955 (N.D. Cal. 
2010); Andrew Pollack, Judge Revokes Approval of Modified Sugar Beets, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 14, 
2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/14/business/14sugar.html?_r=0 
[https://perma.cc/YKC8-ZLJP]. 
173 See Determination of Nonregulated Status of Event 5307 Corn, supra note 59.  Apart from 
those ordered by the courts, the petitions for which APHIS has prepared a full EIS involved 
products engineered to withstand more toxic herbicides, such as Dicamba and 2,4-D, which 
offer growers alternatives to glyphosate use.  Id.  The EIS prepared a statement for Monsanto 
Dicamba and Glufosinate-tolerant cotton and Dicamba and Glufosinate-resistant corn.  Id.  
For DOW, the EIS prepared glyphosate and glufosinate-tolerant soybean; 2,4-D and 
glufosinate-tolerant soybean; and 2,4-D and Glufosinate-tolerant cotton deregulated based 
on EA.  Id. 
174 7 U.S.C. § 136(bb) (2012); see also 40 C.F.R. § 1508.8 (2016). 
175 See § 136(bb); see also 42 U.S.C. § 4372(d)(4) (2012). 
176 See Commission Regulation 1829/03, 2003 O.J. (268) 16; Commission Regulation 
1830/03, 2003 O.J. (268) 23; see also Commission Improves Rules on Labelling and Tracing of GMOs 
in Europe to Enable Freedom of Choice and Ensure Environmental Safety (July 25, 2001), 
https://research.cip.cgiar.org/confluence/download/attachments/3450/F2.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/N6U9-A5DQ]; Report from the Commission to the Council and the European 
Parliament on the Coexistence of Genetically Modified Crops with Conventional and Organic 
Farming (Apr. 2, 2009), http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM: 
2009:0153:FIN:en:PDF [https://perma.cc/N6U9-A5DQ]. 
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GE growers through mandatory isolation distances, exclusion zones, and 
other coexistence rules for certain crops.177  Brazilian law also protects 
non-GE farmers by allocating strict liability for contamination to anyone 
responsible for damage to the environment or third parties from GE.178  
Brazil also mandates the labeling of GE foods and food products.179 
Federal agencies can, in some instances, address socioeconomic 
impacts of genetically engineered crops or foods through their more 
general authority.  For example, a committee appointed by the USDA to 
consider coexistence measures recommended that more data be collected 
to better understand the extent of any economic losses to farmers from 
contamination.180 If action should be needed, the committee 
recommended an insurance scheme modeled on federal crop insurance.181  
In 2009, the Department of Justice (“DOJ”) opened an investigation of the 
consolidation of the seed market and the practices of the major seed 
developers, but the investigation was closed without action three years 
later.182  The Obama Administration’s “Feed the Future” program 
includes an initiative led by the United States Agency for International 
Development (“USAID”) and the USDA “to strengthen international 
public goods research in ways that generate technologies and knowledge 
that support agricultural productivity in both the United States and 
developing countries,” and progress reports on the program highlight a 
couple of genetic engineering initiatives.183 
IV.  POLICY CONSIDERATIONS FOR NEW BIOTECHNOLOGY LEGISLATION 
With the necessity of new legislation comes the freedom to re-imagine 
that legislation to create a better, more nuanced, and more balanced 
approach to regulation.  Instead of sweeping persistent consumer 
                                                
177 See Resolução Normativa, CTNBio No. 4 (Aug. 16, 2007) (corn); Resolução Normativa, 
CTNBio No. 10 (Oct. 2, 2013). 
178 See Art. 20, Lei No. 11,105 (Mar. 24, 2005). 
179 See Art. 6(III), Lei No. 8,078 (Sept. 11, 1990); see also Decreto 4680/03 (Apr. 24, 2003). 
180 See USDA ENHANCING COEXISTENCE, supra note 74, at 9–15. 
181 See id. at 14–15. 
182 See Ian Berry & David Kesmodel, U.S. Closes Antitrust Investigation Into Seed Industry, 
Monsanto, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 16, 2012), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB1000142412 
7887324735104578123631878019070 [https://perma.cc/ZH42-HNCS]; Peter Whoriskey, 
Monsanto’s Dominance Draws Antitrust Inquiry, WASH. POST (Nov. 29, 2009), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/11/28/AR20091128024 
71.html [https://perma.cc/ZE46-AZHA]. 
183 See Feed the Future:  Global Food Security Research Strategy 6 (May 2011), 
https://www.feedthefuture.gov/sites/default/files/resource/files/FTF_research_strateg
y.pdf [https://perma.cc/2S49-UAQX]; see also id. at 40–41; 2015 Feed the Future Progress 
Report 15–16 (2015), https://www.feedthefuture.gov/sites/default/files/resource/files/ 
Feed_the_Future_Results_Summary_Progress_2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/F6LT-WQG9]. 
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objections under the rug, that legislation may be crafted to acknowledge 
areas of scientific uncertainty, to support, rather than thwart, further 
safety research, and to reach ancillary socioeconomic questions relating to 
GMOs and their impacts on the farm, in the market, and around the world 
where the federal government may provide key leadership.  That new 
legislation must address several important policy questions.  The 
questions canvassed below will be examined in detail in future work.184 
A. Framing of Risk Assessment 
An updated legislative and regulatory framework should re-consider 
the appropriate mechanism for determining whether a GE plant variety 
or GE-derived food will be subject to regulatory oversight and at what 
level.  A preliminary question to that determination is whether the 
regulatory mechanism should apply to all new plant varieties and animal 
breeds, or merely those derived using genetic engineering, and if the 
latter, what techniques should qualify as “genetic engineering” for 
regulatory purposes. 
B. Allocation of Regulatory Authority 
As long as the statutory authorization for agency oversight must be 
revised (and it must, as new technology outgrows the PPA and the 
FDCA), the allocation of regulatory authority among the various agencies 
can be reconsidered.  APHIS, the FDA, and the EPA have acquired over a 
quarter-century of experience at biotechnology regulation, but in some 
ways that oversight has been a poor fit for respective agency mandates.  
New legislation could consider various options:  keep the allocation as it 
is (field tests with APHIS, food safety and new animal breed approvals 
with the FDA, and plant pesticides and microorganisms with the EPA); 
reallocate authority among the current agencies (such as giving greater 
environmental oversight responsibility to the EPA); consolidation of 
authority in a single agency such as the FDA; or even creation of a new 
agency that would handle all aspects of biotechnology oversight and 
federally-funded research and monitoring. 
C. Source of Statutory Authority for Agency Oversight 
Can legislative authority for biotechnology regulation be 
accomplished by amending the PPA, FDCA, FIFRA, or TSCA?  Or should 
Congress reject the determination made by the Office of Science and 
                                                
184 See Alison Peck, Re-Imagining Federal Biotechnology Regulation, FOOD & DRUG L.J. 
(forthcoming 2017). 
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Technology Policy in the 1980s that biotechnology regulation could be 
accomplished under statutes that predated the technology?  While 
continuation of authority under the existing statutes seems more 
consistent with a risk-based rather than a process-based model, attempts 
to place jurisdiction under statutes that regulate “plant pests” or “food 
additives” seem increasingly anathema to modern genetic engineering 
techniques.  A third option might include a combination of amendments, 
both substantial and minor, to existing statutes, along with the creation of 
a new federal body with coordinating and review responsibilities through 
new legislation.185 
D. Addressing Socioeconomic Impacts 
New legislation also offers an opportunity to address socioeconomic 
impacts more comprehensively.  Express mandates to monitor and control 
these impacts might be placed in the agencies that oversee new products, 
or in other existing agencies like DOJ or the Federal Trade Commission 
where appropriate.  Initiatives that should be considered and debated 
include coordination of approvals of new GE plant or animal varieties or 
GE-derived foods between the United States and foreign regulators; 
liability insurance schemes or other liability allocation mechanisms for 
farmers injured by contamination with GE varieties; publicly funded 
research for new GE plant and animal varieties of particular benefit to 
farmers in developing countries and beneficial terms for transfer of such 
technology; and, of course, federal labeling rules. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
The Coordinated Framework need not be maintained out of loyalty or 
lethargy.  That framework arose from an urgent desire to approve the first 
GMO products from U.S. developers in the early days of the technology, 
and was based on the type of technology used at the time.  That 
framework failed to address many legitimate concerns shared by many 
consumers, including scientific uncertainty as to safety for human health, 
increasing adverse agronomic and environmental impacts, and lack of 
attention to socioeconomic effects of GMOs in the field and in the 
marketplace.  Moreover, market conditions and technology have evolved 
since 1986 and so must federal oversight.  Since regulation under the PPA, 
FDCA, and FIFRA does not give agencies adequate authority to deal with 
                                                
185 This hybrid approach was attempted by Congress in early efforts to pass new legislation 
governing biotechnology.  See Biotechnology Science Coordination Act, H.R. 4452, 99th 
Cong. (1985), S. 1967, 99th Cong. (1985); Omnibus Biotechnology Act, H.R. 5232, 101st Cong. 
(1990). 
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many of these concerns and changes, it is critical that Congress pass new 
legislation in the near term.  New legislation provides an opportunity to 
include the public’s voice in the conversation and to address the most 
persistently-raised policy concerns in a way that recognizes adverse 
impacts and scientific uncertainty and takes public concerns seriously. 
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